We do not consider the falsity of a judgment as itself an objection to a judgment;
this is perhaps where our new language will sound most foreign. The
question is how far the judgment promotes and preserves life, how well it
preserves, and perhaps even cultivates, the type. And we are fundamentally
inclined to claim that the falsest judgments (which include synthetic
judgments a priori) are the most indispensable to us, and that without accepting
the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the wholly
invented world of the unconditioned and self-identical, without a constant
falsification of the world through numbers, people could not live – that a
renunciation of false judgments would be a renunciation of life, a negation
of life. To acknowledge untruth as a condition of life: this clearly means
resisting the usual value feelings in a dangerous manner; and a philosophy
that risks such a thing would by that gesture alone place itself beyond
good and evil.
